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PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY: ALLIANCE FOR 
THE WILD ROCKIES v. COTTRELL AND THE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
Lawrence Lee Budner* 
Abstract: A preliminary injunction is an order granted prior to a final 
judgment on the merits which prevents a party from continuing with a 
certain conduct. The traditional standard for a preliminary injunction 
requires that a plaintiff show the existence of four elements: likely irrepa-
rable harm, likely success on the merits, balance of hardships in their fa-
vor, and that the public interest favors the injunction. Some courts, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have applied more flexible 
versions of this standard in which there is interplay between the elements 
such that a strong showing of one element might offset a weaker showing 
of another. This Comment argues that such variations of the preliminary 
injunction standard are both in line with recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence and beneficial to environmental plaintiffs seeking to enjoin parties 
from destructive practices. 
Introduction 
 Forest land makes up roughly one-third, or 747 million acres, of the 
United States.1 After centuries of steep decline, U.S. forestland is now 
only two-thirds of what it was four centuries ago, a result primarily of 
agricultural land conversion and urban expansion.2 Deforestation poses 
significant domestic and global problems.3 Most obviously, deforestation 
threatens the ecological communities within forest regions.4 On a global 
level, deforestation greatly contributes to ongoing climate change and 
related atmospheric and hydrological problems.5 Nevertheless, the tim-
ber industry in the United States is immense, with the combined reve-
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 Forest Resources of the United States, Nat’l Atlas of the U.S., nationalatlas.gov/art- 
icles/biology/a_forest.html (last modified Jan. 26, 2011). 
2 Id.; Loss of U.S. Forest Land, Soc’y of Am. Foresters, (Dec. 5, 2009), http://www. 
eforester.org/fp/documents/Loss_of_forest_land.pdf. 
3 Ross W. Gorte & Pervaze V. Sheikh, Cong. Research Serv., R41144, Deforesta-
tion and Climate Change 3–4 (2010); Society of American Foresters, supra note 2. 
4 Society of American Foresters, supra note 2. 
5 See Gorte & Sheikh, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
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nue of the logging industry reaching approximately $9.6 billion in 
2010.6 
 The U. S. Forest Service (Forest Service) is a federal agency within 
the U. S. Department of Agriculture.7 The primary function of the For-
est Service is to administer the country’s national forests.8 Its lofty mis-
sion is “to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation’s 
forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future genera-
tions.”9 Wildfires, like the 2007 Rat Creek Wildfire in Montana, can 
bring environmental devastation and the opportunity for potential 
economic gain through timber sales.10 Wildfires test the veracity of the 
Forest Service’s mission and the Forest Service’s dedication to it.11 Two 
years after the Rat Creek Wildfire ended, the Forest Service declared 
the situation an emergency, designating large portions of the Beaver-
head-Deerlodge National Forest to be logged immediately by the high-
est bidder.12 
 As a result, Alliance for the Wild Rockies (AWR), an environ-
mental advocacy group, brought an action against the Forest Service 
requesting a preliminary injunction to prevent logging of the Beaver-
head-Deerlodge National Forest.13 The district court, however, refused 
to grant AWR’s request for a preliminary injunction, failing to apply the 
more flexible serious questions test in its determination.14 In Alliance for 
the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court erred in failing to 
apply the serious questions test.15 Central to this question was whether 
the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, Winter v. Natural Resources 
                                                                                                                      
6 IBIS World, Logging in the U.S.: U.S. Industry Report (June 30, 2011). 
7 About Us, U.S. Forest Serv., http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/ (last modified Jan. 12, 
2012). 
8 Id. 
9 Mission, Motto, Vision, and Guiding Principles, U.S. Forest Serv., http://www.fs.fed.us/ 
aboutus/mission.shtml (last modified Mar. 7, 2008). 
10See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127(9th Cir. 2011); Douglas 
C. Morton et al., Yale University’s Global Institute of Sustainable Forestry, 
Assessing Environmental, Social, and Economic Impacts of Wildfire 49 (2003), 
http://environment.yale.edu/gisf/files/pdfs/wildfire_report.pdf. 
11 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1127. 
12 Id. at 1129–30. 
13 Id. at 1128–29; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Alliance for the Wild Rockies, http:// 
wildrockiesalliance.org (last visited May 20, 2012). 
14 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 
15 Id. at 1131–32. 
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Defense Council, allows for the application of the serious questions test 
when assessing a request for a preliminary injunction.16 
 A lack of consensus among federal circuit courts as to the legiti-
macy of the serious questions test raises two important questions.17 
First, was Alliance correct in holding that Winter does not foreclose the 
serious questions test?18 Second, which preliminary injunction standard 
is most beneficial from an environmental standpoint? This Comment 
argues that Alliance’s affirmation of the serious questions test is valid 
notwithstanding Winter, and that the decision will ultimately preserve 
flexibility and benefit environmental plaintiffs seeking equitable relief. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In August and September of 2007, the Rat Creek Wildfire raged 
through Montana, burning about 27,000 acres of the Beaverhead-
Deerlodge National Forest.19 Roughly two years after the fire, on July 1, 
2009, the Chief Forester of the U. S. Forest Service (Forest Service) 
made an Emergency Situation Determination (ESD).20 This determina-
tion authorized immediate logging on thirty-five units of land, a total of 
approximately 1642 acres.21 Through the ESD, the Forest Service was 
able to bypass delays that would likely have resulted from its administra-
tive appeals process—processes that ensure the soundness of the Forest 
Service’s decision-making.22 
 According to the Forest Service, the logging project sought to “re-
cover and utilize timber from trees that are dead or dying as a result of 
the Rat Creek Wildfire or forest insects and disease . . . .”23 In turn, the 
Forest Service would supply the harvested trees to the forest products 
                                                                                                                      
16 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131–32; see Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
17 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming the validity of the sliding scale approach); Hoosier 
Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 
2009) (holding that a high degree of “net harm” can offset a weaker claim on the merits); 
Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(invalidating the sliding scale approach). 
18 Compare Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (affirming the validity of the se-
rious questions test), with Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347 (holding more flexible standards 
invalid in light of Winter). 
19 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1129. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 1136. 
23 Id. at 1129. 
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industry.24 The project included the logging of trees from four to fifteen 
inches in diameter at “breast height” that died or were considered likely 
to die.25 The Forest Service used its own internal “species-specific guide-
lines for determining likelihood of mortality,” and therein which trees 
should be cut down and sold.26 Additionally, the project called for the 
construction and alteration of roads within the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
National Forest.27 After the completion of the logging project, the tem-
porary roads would be destroyed. 28 
 That April, the Forest Service provided an Environmental Assess-
ment (EA) of the project for public comment.29 This routine adminis-
trative function allows the public to weigh in on Forest Service “activities 
implementing land and resource management plans.”30 In June of 
2009, the Acting Forest Supervisor requested that the Chief Forester 
issue an ESD for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest.31 Accord-
ing to the Forest Supervisor, the project would, “‘prevent substantial 
economic loss to the Federal Government.’”32 Within the request, the 
Supervisor cited local economic concerns, stating that “‘[a]s markets 
decline and harvest activities on private lands decrease, the timber in-
dustry in Montana increasingly depends on National Forest System tim-
ber supply as an essential element to keep their mills operational.’”33 
                                                                                                                     
 On June 22, 2009, the Regional Forester in turn forwarded the 
ESD request to the Chief Forester, similarly positing that a delay in log-
ging would, “‘result in substantial loss of economic value to the Federal 
Government.’”34 Less than three weeks later, the Chief Forester issued 
the ESD, taking note that the failure to commence logging would ad-
versely affect the federal government and the local Montana economy 
and lumber mills.35 
 On July 22, 2009, the Forest Service issued a Decision Notice and 
Finding of No Significant Impact as well as the final EA.36 The Forest 
Service concluded that the logging project would not have a significant 
 
24 Id. 
25 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1129. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See 36 C.F.R. § 215.1 (2011). 
31 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1129. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1130. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
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adverse effect on the environment, and therefore an Environmental 
Impact Statement was not required.37 Shortly thereafter, the Forest Ser-
vice began the bidding process.38 On July 10, 2009 the highest bid went 
to Barry Smith Logging.39 That August, Barry Smith Logging began 
the project, successfully logging forty-nine percent of the planned areas 
before winter interrupted their progress.40 
 Alliance for the Wild Rockies (AWR) filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of Montana.41 AWR alleged violations of 
the Appeals Reform Act, the National Forest Management Act, and the 
National Environmental Policy Act.42 Along with these allegations, AWR 
requested a preliminary injunction.43 On August 14, 2009, the district 
court issued a brief order denying AWR’s request for a preliminary in-
junction.44 On January 25, 2011, AWR filed its appeal with the Ninth 
Circuit.45 Although the logging was already underway at the time AWR 
filed its appeal, the appeal was not moot as a significant portion of the 
project was incomplete.46 
II. Legal Background 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council articulates the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.47 
In Winter, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the U.S. 
Navy from conducting warfare training in the biologically diverse 
Southern California area.48 These military training exercises involved 
the use of active sonar, which adversely affects the physiology and be-
havior of marine mammals.49 The Court denied plaintiffs’ request for a 
preliminary injunction, and invalidated the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                      
37 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1130; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(“[A]ll agen-
cies of the Federal Government shall . . . include in every recommendation or report . . . a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action.”). 
38 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1130. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1131. 
41 See id. at 1130. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1130. 
45 Id. at 1127. 
46 Id. at 1131. 
47 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
48 Id. at 14–16. 
49 Id. at 52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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peals’ approach to issuing such injunctions.50 The Supreme Court 
stated that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer ir-
reparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public inter-
est.”51 Thus, the Supreme Court refuted the Ninth Circuit’s previous 
standard that preliminary injunctions may be issued based on the possi-
bility of irreparable harm.52 According to the Court, the more stringent 
requirement is consistent with traditional conceptions of a preliminary 
injunction “as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon 
a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”53 
 Winter did not, however, explicitly discuss the validity of either the 
“sliding scale” approach or the serious questions test.54 Employed by the 
Ninth Circuit and other federal circuits, the sliding scale approach bal-
ances the elements of a preliminary injunction test “so that a stronger 
showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.”55 
 The serious questions test slightly modifies the sliding scale ap-
proach.56 The test has a long history within the Ninth Circuit and else-
where.57 Under the serious questions test, a court could issue a prelimi-
nary injunction “where the likelihood of success is such that ‘serious 
questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships 
tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor.’”58 Simply put, a plaintiff need not show 
that his case is likely to succeed, but rather that serious questions going 
to the merits exist.59 
 Despite Winter’s silence on the matter, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in 
the case suggests that Winter left the sliding scale and serious questions 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 12, 22 (majority opinion). 
51 Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 22. 
53 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). 
54 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131; see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (stating that the Supreme Court has never rejected the sliding scale 
approach). 
55 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131(citing Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003)). For example, under the sliding 
scale approach, “a stronger showing of irreparable harm to plaintiff might offset a lesser 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. 
56 See id. (citing Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 340 F.3d at 813). 
57 See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 
(9th Cir. 1980); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 
(9th. Cir. 1975). 
58 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131(citing Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 340 
F.3d at 813). 
59 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 
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approaches intact.60 The dissent emphasized flexibility as a “hallmark 
of equity jurisdiction,” noting that courts have traditionally assessed 
“claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ sometimes awarding re-
lief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of success 
is very high.”61 
 Before Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, three other federal cir-
cuit courts confronted the issue of whether the sliding scale, or its 
modifications, survived Winter.62 These courts split on the issue.63Al-
though the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the sliding scale ap-
proach to be invalid in Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election 
Commission, both the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals found otherwise.64 In Hoosier Energy Rural Elec-
tric Co-operative, Inc. v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., the Seventh Cir-
cuit held the sliding scale test to be valid, finding that a high degree of 
“net harm” can offset a weaker claim on the merits.65 The Hoosier court 
issued a preliminary injunction preventing a third party from demand-
ing payment.66 Although the court did not find a likelihood of success on 
the merits, plaintiffs’ arguments that the transaction was an “abusive tax 
shelter” and that the IRS had previously declined similar transactions 
were sufficient to raise serious questions on the merits.67 
 Similarly embracing the sliding scale approach, the Second Circuit 
found that the Winter decision did not undermine the legitimacy of a 
more flexible approach.68 In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., the Second Circuit affirmed a lower 
court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants 
from proceeding with an arbitration initiated before the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).69 In Citigroup the contested issue 
as to whether VCG was a “customer” within the FINRA rules was suffi-
                                                                                                                      
60 Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. 
62 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life 
Ins. Co.,582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009);Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). 
63 Compare Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37, and Hoosier, 582 F.3d at 725, with Real Truth, 574 at 
347. 
64 Compare Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37, and Hoosier, 582 F.3d at 725, with Real Truth, 574 at 
347. 
65 582 F.3d at 725. 
66 See id. at 724–25. 
67 Id. at 725. 
68 Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37. 
69 Id. at 39–40. 
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cient to pose a serious question going to the merits and thus justify the 
issuance of the preliminary injunction.70 
 Some district courts within the Ninth Circuit have confronted the 
issue of Winter’s effect on the sliding scale and serious questions ap-
proaches; others have simply applied the serious questions test, Winter 
notwithstanding.71 For example, in Save Strawberry Canyon v. Department 
of Energy, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that the sliding scale approach survived Winter.72 In a 
subsequent order, the court cited traditional equitable powers of dis-
trict courts, and Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Winter, to support the con-
tinuing validity of the sliding scale approach.73 The issue of whether 
Winter forecloses the application of the sliding scale test was one the 
Ninth Circuit sought to clarify in Alliance.74 
III. Analysis 
 In Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court’s failure to apply the serious questions 
test and held the serious questions test to be valid.75 “That is, ‘serious 
questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips 
sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary in-
junction.”76 Applying the test, the court further held that there existed 
a likelihood of irreparable harm, that there were serious questions go-
ing to the merits, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in plain-
tiff’s favor, and that public interest favored a preliminary injunction.77 
The court accordingly concluded that the trial court erred in denying 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. at 39. 
71 See, e.g., Save Strawberry Canyon v. Dep’t of Energy, No. C 08-03494 WHA, 2009 WL 
1098888, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr 22, 2009) (order regarding preliminary injunction stan-
dard); Quinault Indian Nation v. Kempthorne, No. C 09-5064 RBL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 
2009); Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 08-2649 CW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
20, 2009). 
72 Save Strawberry Canyon, 2009 WL 1098888, at *3 (order regarding preliminary in-
junction standard). 
73 Id. 
74 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1129. The Ninth Circuit did, however, pre-
viously provide in a footnote in Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Timchak that “Winter did not 
reject the sliding scale approach we employ in the alternative,” despite declining “to define 
the sliding-scale-formulation’s precise post-Winter contours.” 323 F. App’x 512, 513 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (mem.). 
75 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1139. 
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the request by Alliance for the Wild Rockies (AWR) for a preliminary 
injunction, and remanded the case.78 
 With regard to the first consideration in a preliminary injunction 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that the logging project was likely to 
cause irreparable harm.79 In this, the Ninth Circuit followed the Su-
preme Court’s lead in requiring likely, rather than merely possible, 
harm.80 Despite the U.S. Forest Service’s (Forest Service) arguments 
that AWR members will still be able to enjoy and utilize other areas of 
the Forest, the court held that the logging project would irreparably 
harm AWR members insofar as it would prevent them from fully view-
ing, experiencing, and utilizing the forest.81 
 The court then found that there existed serious questions going to 
the merits.82 Among AWR’s strongest arguments going to the merits 
was that the Forest Service violated the Appeals Reform Act by granting 
the Emergency Situation Determination (ESD).83 The issuance of the 
ESD deprived AWR of the administrative appeals process ordinarily 
available for such logging projects.84 Had the Forest Service’s ESD been 
appealed administratively, members of the public, such as AWR, would 
have had the opportunity to object to the logging project.85 The Forest 
Service gave no such opportunity.86 In granting the ESD, the Chief For-
ester considered (1) the economic loss to the government due to the 
Project’s delayed commencement;87 (2) “the potential loss of an ‘op-
portunity to accomplish Douglas-fir planting and dwarf mistletoe con-
trol objectives;”88 and (3) the Project’s potential contribution to the 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1135. 
80 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); Alliance for the Wild Rock-
ies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 
81 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 
82 Id. at 1137. 
83 Id. at 1135–36. 
84 Id. at 1136 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1136. With regard to the first factor, the loss 
of receipts to the government, the court found that the $16,000 to $70,000 loss was not 
“substantial.” Id. Conceding that in some contexts, $70,000 might be a substantial loss, the 
court emphasized that the figure was “highly speculative.” Id. 
88 Id. With regard to the second factor in the Chief Forester’s analysis, the court found 
that the potential loss of opportunity to accomplish Douglas-fir planting “would be an 
actual loss only if there were no successful bid on the Project” and that such a possibility 
was “highly speculative.” Id at 1137. 
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local Montana economy.89 The Ninth Circuit held that there were at 
least serious questions on the merits as to whether these three factors 
were sufficient to justify the ESD.90 Moreover, the court emphasized 
that the Forest Service’s delay in waiting two years before issuing the 
ESD undermined their contention that there was an emergency that 
justified the elimination of the usual administrative appeals process.91 
 In regard to the third element of the preliminary injunction analy-
sis, the Ninth Circuit found “that the balance of hardships between the 
parties tip[ped] sharply in favor of AWR.”92 In analyzing the “balance 
of hardships” courts look at the extent of the harm that has resulted, or 
will result, if the preliminary injunction is either granted or refused.93 
The court broke AWR’s hardships into two categories: the harm to the 
recreational and work opportunities that would otherwise be available 
on the land, and the harm resulting from AWR’s inability to engage in 
the administrative appeals process.94 The court balanced these hard-
ships with the Forest Service’s estimated potential loss of $16,000, and 
the “more speculative loss of up to $70,000.”95 These potential mone-
tary losses, however, did not outweigh the harm done to AWR.96 
 Finally, the court considered the public interest element, finding 
that the public interest favored the issuance of the injunction.97 In fa-
vor of granting the injunction, the court emphasized the “public inter-
est in preserving nature and avoiding irreparable environmental in-
jury.”98 Moreover, the court held that suspending federal projects until 
a “careful consideration of environmental impacts . . . comports with 
the public interest.”99 Comparing the public interest in environmental 
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. at 1136. With regard to the third, and final, consideration in the Chief Forester’s 
analysis, the court held that in considering local economic effects, “the Chief Forester 
relied on factors Congress did not intend [her] to consider.’” Id. at 1137. Although such 
economic effects may be relevant to the public interest element of the preliminary injunc-
tion analysis, local economic effects are not a consideration under Forest Service regula-
tions. Id. 
90 Id. at 1137. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1137–38. 
94 Id. at 1137. 
95 Id. at 1138. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at1139. 
98 Id. at 1138 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
99 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138 (quoting S. Fork Band Council of W. 
Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2009)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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preservation with the economic concerns raised by the Forest Service, 
the court found that the public interest favored the issuance of the in-
junction.100 Accordingly, the court found that AWR’s request estab-
lished all four elements of the preliminary injunction standard.101 
                                                                                                                     
 The positive impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alliance ex-
tends beyond the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest.102 Barring 
any contrary Supreme Court directives, Alliance solidifies, at least within 
the Ninth Circuit, the legitimacy of the more flexible serious questions 
and sliding scale approaches to issuing a preliminary injunction.103 As 
previously mentioned, however, not all courts have joined the Ninth 
Circuit in embracing these tests.104 Most notably, in Real Truth About 
Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Winter precludes interplay among the elements of a 
preliminary injunction.105 According to the Fourth Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation of Winter, the decision requires a plaintiff to clearly 
demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits, rather than 
simply show that serious questions going to the merits exist.106 This in-
consistency among federal circuits raises two questions. First, and most 
obviously, which characterization of the serious questions test is correct 
in light of Winter?107 Second, which approach is most beneficial from an 
environmental standpoint? 
 Potentially, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alliance sidesteps the 
Winter Court’s attempt to raise the bar for plaintiffs seeking preliminary 
injunctions.108 On its face, the Winter decision’s requirement that plain-
tiffs show a likely irreparable harm signals a road block for environ-
mental plaintiffs seeking to enjoin parties who are engaging in envi-
ronmentally destructive practices.109 Although the Alliance court 
 
 
100 Id. at 1138–39. 
101 Id. at 1139. 
102 Id. at 1135. 
103 See id. at 1132, 1135. 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
105 Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
106 See id. 
107 Compare Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (affirming the validity of the 
serious questions test), with Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347 (holding more flexible standards 
invalid in light of Winter). 
108 See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (upholding 
the “serious questions test” notwithstanding Winter’s characterization of a preliminary in-
junction as an extraordinary remedy). 
109 See Benjamin I. Narodick, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council: Going into 
the Belly of the Whale of Preliminary Injunctions and Environmental Law, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. 
L. 332, 345–47 (2009) (“[t]he combination of increasing judicial deference to the execu-
26 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
heeded the Supreme Court’s directive to employ a likely harm standard, 
its application of the serious questions test negated the heightened 
standard.110 In effect, Alliance shifts emphasis to the other elements of 
the preliminary injunction standard without actually raising the bar for 
plaintiffs.111 Alliance acquiesces to the Supreme Court’s “likely harm” 
standard while at the same time leniently construing the “likelihood of 
success on the merits” element such that a plaintiff need only show “se-
rious questions going to the merits.”112 One commenter accurately 
notes that the issue becomes one of semantics.113 As long as the Ninth 
Circuit continues to apply the sliding scale and serious questions tests, 
Winter’s impact will be slight.114 
 Although Alliance is not directly in line with Winter, the decision’s 
affirmation of the serious questions test is valid.115 The Supreme 
Court’s conspicuous decision to not invalidate the sliding scale and se-
rious questions approaches explicitly supports the legitimacy of the Al-
liance decision, especially considering the Ninth Circuit’s lengthy his-
tory of applying these tests.116 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
notes, if the Supreme Court meant to “abrogate the more flexible stan-
dard[s], one would expect some reference to the considerable history 
of the flexible standards applied in various circuits and the Supreme 
Court.”117 Winter, however, lacks any command that would preclude the 
application of the of the serious questions test.118 
 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s lenient construction of the Winter 
standard for a preliminary injunction is consistent with equitable prin-
ciples.119 To consider the standard as four discrete criteria rather than 
                                                                                                                      
 
tive branch, a diminished judicial value of environmental protection, and greater proce-
dural barriers to obtain injunctions may make environmental litigation not only more 
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an interplay between four equitable considerations is inconsistent with 
the concept of equitable relief.120 As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dis-
sent in Winter, “[f]lexibility is the hallmark of equity jurisdiction . . . . 
Consistent with equity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants uni-
formly show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable success 
or injury before awarding equitable relief.”121 Alliance succeeds in pre-
serving the flexibility necessary for administering equitable relief.122 If 
Winter puts environmental plaintiffs seeking equitable relief at a disad-
vantage, Alliance succeeds in minimizing these effects.123 In applying 
the sliding scale and serious questions tests, courts are in a better posi-
tion to respond to the particular equities of a complex factual sce-
nario.124 These approaches prevent potentially deserving environ-
mental plaintiffs from being shut out early in the litigation process.125 
 Not only is the serious questions test not inconsistent with Winter, it 
is more beneficial from an environmental standpoint.126 In the face of 
the Supreme Court’s blow to environmental plaintiffs, Alliance provides 
relief insofar as plaintiffs are more likely to succeed in seeking to enjoin 
parties from engaging in environmentally destructive conduct.127 In 
holding that plaintiffs may obtain a preliminary injunction by showing 
serious questions going to the merits, rather than a “likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits,” the Ninth Circuit alleviates the heavy weight that 
Winter seemingly placed on plaintiffs seeking equitable relief.128 
 The Alliance decision has already proven beneficial to environ-
mental plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.129 In Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakama Nation v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the court granted 
plaintiff’s request to enjoin the USDA from shipping garbage from Ha-
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waii to a landfill located within the Yakama nation’s territory.130 If suc-
cessful, the dumping would likely have negatively impacted hunting, 
gathering, and fishing practices in the area, as well as introduced inva-
sive species and contamination to the land’s resources and waterways.131 
Citing to Alliance, however, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakama 
Nation court found that serious questions existed as to whether the 
USDA’s Environmental Assessment “sufficiently analyzed the impacts 
that the shipment of Hawaiian garbage [would have had] on the af-
fected Northwest area.”132 Although the court did not find that plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed on this issue, the serious questions raised were suf-
ficient to justify the issuance of the injunction.133 As such, the court’s 
application of the serious questions test allowed the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction that might otherwise not have been granted.134 The 
Alliance decision and future application of the serious questions test will 
yield similar results within the Ninth Circuit.135 As long as plaintiffs are 
able to show that a balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor, an 
inability to show a likelihood of success will no longer preclude plaintiffs 
from obtaining a preliminary injunction.136 
Conclusion 
 In its validation of the serious questions and sliding scale ap-
proaches for issuance of a preliminary injunction, Alliance affirms within 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a more flexible approach.137 Al-
though the decision arguably runs counter to the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Winter, Alliance’s validity should not be questioned because Win-
ter does not expressly invalidate these more flexible approaches.138 
Moreover, the flexible approaches allow courts to better assess complex 
factual scenarios and make it easier for environmental plaintiffs to ob-
tain equitable relief.139 
 
130 Id. at *1, *5. 
131 Id. at *4. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakama Nation, 2010 WL 
3434091, at *4. 
135 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135; Confederated Tribes and Bands of Ya-
kama Nation, 2010 WL 3434091, at *4. 
136 See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1132, 1135; Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
Yakama Nation, 2010 WL 3434091, at *4. 
137 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. 
139 See supra notes 119–125 and accompanying text. 
